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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
pencies, which is unlikely, after the 1955 enactments are incorporated
into the code-will still only be prima facie evidence of the law.'
The statute law committee will continue the work of preparing a
code for Washington which will be an organized and accurate restate-
ment of legislative enactments. It is hoped that the code which is
presently in the process of being "reprepared" will, when completed,




By the enactment of the Unclaimed Personal Property Act at the
1955 Session of the legislature' Washington became the first state to
adopt the recently approved Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Pro-
perty Act.2 Several significant changes in the Uniform Act were made,
but the Washington statute appears to serve the basic purpose of the
Uniform Act-that of avoiding multiple liability on the part of holders
of unclaimed property where two or more states having jurisdiction
over the property enact inconsistent statutes dealing with unclaimed
property.' Of course, the Washington statute also serves the purpose
which will undoubtedly make the Uniform Act attractive to other juris-
dictions without a comprehensive statute governing unclaimed property
-that of providing additional revenue for state operations.
The statute is custodial in nature and does not result in an automatic
2 Chapter 5, Laws of 1955.
3 RCW 1.08.026.
1 C. 385, as amended L. 55 (Extraordinary Session), c. 11.
2 The Uniform Act was approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws at the conference held on August 9-14, 1954. According to the
records of the National Conference, the Uniform Act has been adopted in no other
jurisdiction.
8 In Connecticut Mutual Insurance Co. v. Moore, 333 U.S. 541 (1947), the Supreme
Court of the United States held that the State of New York might take possession of
unclaimed funds due on insurance policies issued to persons in New York, even though
the insurance company holding the funds had its domicile in another state. In Standard
Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428 (1951), the Supreme Court held that the State of
New Jersey might escheat stock and dividends due on the stock of a corporation or-
ganized under its laws even though the last known address of the holders of the stock
were at places outside New Jersey. Even if the possibility of multiple liability on the
part of the holder of unclaimed property suggested by the two decisions might be
avoided under the full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution, an
undesireable race of diligence between states having jurisdiction over the property and
the holder could result. Section 10 of the Uniform Act and Section 10 of the Washing-
ton statute avoid this result by giving recognition, on the basis of reciprocity, to the
laws of other states concerning abandoned and escheated property and giving the state
of last known address of the owner of the claim custody of the property.
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loss or forfeiture of the owner's property rights. Unless an action to
escheat is instituted the state remains custodian of the property in
perpetuity, with no limitation on the time within which the owner
must file a claim for return of the property. However, section 22 of
the Washington statute does direct the Tax Commission to institute
escheat proceedings whenever it appears that the owner of abandoned
property delivered to the Commission has died and that no other person
is entitled to it. If a decree of distribution entered in such a proceeding
declares the property escheated, it appears that even claimants having
no knowledge of such proceedings are bound thereby and can apply to
the state for relief as a matter of grace only.4
The unclaimed property covered by the statute. includes: bank depo-
sits; deposits and funds paid for the purchase of shares in savings and
loan associations, credit unions and similar organizations; funds due
on life insurance policies, endowment policies, and annuities; deposits
made with public utilities and refunds which a utility has been ordered
to make; stock, dividends, and profit distributions of business associa-
tions; intangible personal property distributable in the course of volun-
tary dissolutions of business associations; property and income held in
a fiduciary capacity by business associations, banks, and other financial
organizations; and intangible personal property held by any, court or
public authority. Various criteria are established by the statute for
determining when different types of property will be presumed to have
been abandoned. For example, section 2 (1) of the statute provides
that bank deposits will be presumed to be abandoned "... unless the
owner has, within twelve years: (a) increased or decreased the amount
of the deposit, or presented the passbook or other similar evidence of
the deposit for the crediting of interest;, or (b) corresponded in writing
with the banking organization concerning the deposit; or (c) otherwise
indicated an interest in the deposit as evidenced by a memorandum on
file with the banking organization."
Section 9 of the statute is a general, catch-all provision, which will
probably be of most general interest. It includes, "All intangible per-
sonal property, not otherwise covered by this act, including any income
or increment thereon and deducting any lawful charges, that is held or
owing in this state in the ordinary course of the holder's business and
has remained unclaimed by the owner for more than seven years after
it became payable or distributable.. : Provided, however That this sec-
4 See In re Bailey's Estate, 178 Wash. 173, 34 P.2d 448 (1934).
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tion shall not apply to safe deposit companies."' As the annotations
to the Uniform Act point out, to be subject to this section the property
must be held or owing "in this state in the ordinary course of the
holder's business." According to the annotations to the Uniform Act,
the section is intended to embrace a wide variety of items, ". . . includ-
ing, by way of illustration, money, stocks, bonds, certificates of mem-
bership in corporations, securities, bills of exchange, deposits, interest,
dividends, income, amounts due and payable under the terms of insur-
ance policies not covered by section 4, pension trust agreements, profit-
sharing plans, credit balances on paid wages, security deposits, refunds,
funds deposited to redeem stocks, bonds, coupons and other securities,
or to make a distribution thereof, together with any interest or incre-
ment thereon."
Although the language of section 9 of the Washington statute is
identical with that of the Uniform Act, it may have considerably less
effect than it would under the unaltered Uniform Act. The Washington
statute omits section 16 of the Uniform Act, which, as will be pointed
out below, would make the fact that the applicable statute of limitations
had run of no effect on the duty to report and deliver abandoned pro-
perty to the state.
The procedural provisions of the statute establish a somewhat in-
volved sequence of events in the process of reporting and delivering
abandoned property to the Tax Commission, designed to afford ade-
quate notice to the owners of the property.'
5 The exception of safe deposit companies from the effect of this section was a de-
parture from the Uniform Act, as was the elimination of a fourth subsection from
section 2 of the Uniform Act which would have made subject to the Act "Any funds
or other personal property, tangible or intangible, removed from a safe deposit box...
on which the lease or rental period has expired due to non-payment of rental charges
or other reason...."
6 Section 11 requires that the holders of property presumed to be abandoned file a
report of such property held as of June 30 of each year before November 1 of that year.
Within 120 days after the filing of the report, the Tax Commission is required to
publish a notice for two successive weeks in the county of the last known address of
persons named in the report. Within the same period of time, the Tax Commission
is required to mail a notice to persons appearing to be entitled to the property.6
Owners of unclaimed property are given 65 days from the date of the last publication
of notice within which to claim the property from the holder. If the property is un-
claimed within that time, the holder is required to pay or deliver the property to the
Tax Commission, within 75 days after publication of the last notice. Upon delivery
to the Tax Commission, the holder is relieved of all liability to the extent of such
property delivered. The Tax Commission is authorized to sell all such property other
than money at such time and in such a manner as will in its judgment bring the highest
return. The proceeds of sales of the property are to be deposited to the general fund
of the state, except that the Tax Commission is directed to establish a separate trust
fund of one hundred thousand dollars from which to make prompt settlement of
claims of owners. Persons claiming an interest in property which was not adjudged to
be abandoned or escheated may make claims either to the former holder or to the
Tax Commission. Determination by the former holder that the claimant is the true
[AUGUST
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As mentioned, above, the Washington statute does not include section
16 of the Uniform Act, relating to the effect of statutes of limitations.
The purpose of Section 16 of the Uniform Act is to subject unclaimed
property to the Act even though the applicable period of limitations has
run prior to the date of presumed abandonment.
The Uniform Act is subject to the criticism that it may thereby make
it possible for a party to avoid the bar of the statute of limitations on
a particular claim which'his debtor has'paid or delivered to the Tax
Commission by applying to the Tax Commission for a return of property
or money." Probably such a claimant would have been barred under
the Washington statute by the exception of property . .. subsequently
adjudged.., to be actually abandoned or escheated..." from the pro-
perties which an owner may reclaim from the state.' An express excep-
tion of claims which were barred by the statute of limitations from
the refund provision of the Act could have been inserted to avoid the
possibility of circumvention. The alternative selected by the legislature
-omission of section 16 of the Uniform Act-will probably result in
litigation as well as the loss of funds for which the owner's claim would
be barred by the statute of limitations.' Such funds might otherwise
have been recoverable under the general, catch-all provisions of section
9. For those types of property and claims for which a demand is neces-
sary to start the running of the applicable statute of limitations, omis-
sion of section 16 of the Uniform Act should be of no effect.
• Another significant departure from the Uniform Act worthy of com-
ment is the addition in section 27 of the Act of a limitation of the fees
which might be charged an owner or other person for finding or pur-
porting to find property which has been reported or paid to the Tax
Commission. The charging of a fee in excess of five percent of the
owner, is, in the absence of fraud, binding upon the Tax Commission, which is directed
by the statute to make prompt payment to the claimant upon receipt of a certificate of
the former holder's determination. Claims to the Tax Commission are to be approved
or rejected in writing. Upon rejection by the Tax Commission, a hearing before the
Commission may be demanded, with the right of appeal and trial de novo in the Superior
Court of Thurston County.
7 Likewise, insofar as the statute of limitations is viewed as a protection from stale
claims on which evidence may have become unavailable, it is questionable whether it is
wise to subject parties to a claim by the state on what is the same cause of action at
the still later time when the claim is presumed to have been abandoned under the Act.
8 L. 1955, c. 385, § 19(1).
9 Cf. State v. Standard Oil Company, 5 N.J. 381, 293, 74 A.2d 565, 570. A further
indication that the legislature intended to forego those claims which are barred by the
applicable statute of limitations can be found in the omission of the seventh subsection
of section 11 of the Uniform Act. That subsection provides: "The initial report filed
under this act [by a holder] shall include all items of property that would have been




value of such property constitutes a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine
of not less than the amount of the fee and not more than ten times such
amount, imprisonment for not more than thirty days, or both. The
legislature has thereby discouraged the establishment of businesses
specializing in the production of claimants with a resultant loss in state
revenues. The provision also protects owners from exorbitant charges
which they might have to pay for information later coming to them
under the publication and notice provisions of the statute.
CORNELIUS J. PECK
REAL PROPERTY
Eminent Domain. In State ex rel. Eastvold v. Yelle,' the court held
the order-of-immediate-possession statute (RCW 8.04.090) violated
the constitutional requirement of Article II, section 16, amendment 9,
that just compensation must first be determined by litigation. Fast and
orderly development of the state highway program is made more diffi-
cult by this barrier. The legislature took steps to facilitate the highway
program in adoption of House Joint Resolution 22, proposing, for vote
in November, 1956, an amendment to the constitution by insertion of
except that after the filing of an action in eminent domain the state
shall be entitled to immediate possession of property upon payment
into court, before trial, of such amount as shall be provided by law.
If the voters approve the proposed amendment, the legislature may
provide adequate safeguards for the landowner whose property must
be taken by the state in the road program.
In the meantime, Chapter 213 provides in section 4 for stipulation
by the state and the condemnee for immediate possession, which can
speed cooperative acquisition, when the area of dispute is cost, without
the necessity of full trial before acquisition. In addition, by section 3,
special juries shall (formerly, may) be called if there would otherwise
be a delay of more than sixty days until the next regular jury term.
Chapter 156 authorizes a single jury to determine values in separate
trials under a single petition filed by the state. Sections 4 and 5 permit
award of damages taking into account the feasibility of moving struc-
tures from the area taken, and permitting the state to move structures
if an order directing removal is not otherwise complied with. Section 6
eliminates the provision formerly in RCW 8.04.010 calling for inability
1146 Wash. Dec. 155, 279 P.2d 645 (1955).
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